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Abstract. Although replication is a central tenet of science, direct replications are rare in psychology. This research tested variation in the
replicability of 13 classic and contemporary effects across 36 independent samples totaling 6,344 participants. In the aggregate, 10 effects
replicated consistently. One effect – imagined contact reducing prejudice – showed weak support for replicability. And two effects – flag
priming influencing conservatism and currency priming influencing system justification – did not replicate. We compared whether the
conditions such as lab versus online or US versus international sample predicted effect magnitudes. By and large they did not. The results of this
small sample of effects suggest that replicability is more dependent on the effect itself than on the sample and setting used to investigate the
effect.
Keywords: replication, reproducibility, generalizability, cross-cultural, variation
Replication is a central tenet of science; its purpose is to
confirm the accuracy of empirical findings, clarify the con-
ditions under which an effect can be observed, and estimate
the true effect size (Brandt et al., 2013; Open Science
Collaboration, 2012, 2014). Successful replication of an
experiment requires the recreation of the essential condi-
tions of the initial experiment. This is often easier said than
done. There may be an enormous number of variables
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influencing experimental results, and yet only a few tested.
In the behavioral sciences, many effects have been
observed in one cultural context, but not observed in others.
Likewise, individuals within the same society, or even the
same individual at different times (Bodenhausen, 1990),
may differ in ways that moderate any particular result.
Direct replication is infrequent, resulting in a published
literature that sustains spurious findings (Ioannidis, 2005)
and a lack of identification of the eliciting conditions for
an effect. While there are good epistemological reasons
for assuming that observed phenomena generalize across
individuals and contexts in the absence of contrary evi-
dence, the failure to directly replicate findings is problem-
atic for theoretical and practical reasons. Failure to identify
moderators and boundary conditions of an effect may result
in overly broad generalizations of true effects across situa-
tions (Cesario, 2014) or across individuals (Henrich, Heine,
& Norenzayan, 2010). Similarly, overgeneralization may
lead observations made under laboratory observations to
be inappropriately extended to ecological contexts that dif-
fer in important ways (Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, &
Crawford, 2004). Practically, attempts to closely replicate
research findings can reveal important differences in what
is considered a direct replication (Schmidt, 2009), thus
leading to refinements of the initial theory (e.g., Aronson,
1992; Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, & Baumgardner,
1986). Close replication can also lead to the clarification
of tacit methodological knowledge that is necessary to elicit
the effect of interest (Collins, 1974).
Overview of the Present Research
Little attempt has been made to assess the variation in rep-
licability of findings across samples and research contexts.
This project examines the variation in replicability of
13 classic and contemporary psychological effects across
36 samples and settings. Some of the selected effects are
known to be highly replicable; for others, replicability is
unknown. Some may depend on social context or partici-
pant sample, others may not. We bundled the selected stud-
ies together into a brief, easy-to-administer experiment that
was delivered to each participating sample through a single
infrastructure (http://projectimplicit.net/).
There are many factors that can influence the replicabil-
ity of an effect such as sample, setting, statistical power,
and procedural variations. The present design standardizes
procedural characteristics and ensures appropriate statistical
power in order to examine the effects of sample and setting
on replicability. At one extreme, sample and situational
characteristics might have little effect on the tested effects
– variation in effect magnitudes may not exceed expected
random error. At the other extreme, effects might be highly
contextualized – for example, replicating only with sample
and situational characteristics that are highly consistent
with the original circumstances. The primary contribution
of this investigation is to establish a paradigm for testing
replicability across samples and settings and provide a rich
data set that allows the determinants of replicability to be
explored. A secondary purpose is to demonstrate support
for replicability for the 13 chosen effects. Ideally, the
results will stimulate theoretical developments about
the conditions under which replication will be robust to
the inevitable variation in circumstances of data collection.
Method
Researcher Recruitment and Data Collection
Sites
Project leads posted a call for collaborators to the online
forum of the Open Science Collaboration on February 21,
2013 and to the SPSP Discussion List on July 13, 2013.
Other colleagues were contacted personally. For inclusion,
each replication team had to: (1) follow local ethical proce-
dures, (2) administer the protocol as specified, (3) collect
data from at least 80 participants,1 (4) post a video simula-
tion of the setting and administration procedure, and
(5) document key features of recruiting, sample, and any
changes to the standard protocol. In total, there were
36 samples and settings that collected data from a total of
6,344 participants (27 data collections in a laboratory and
9 conducted online; 25 from the US, 11 from other coun-
tries; see Table 1 for a brief description of sites and for a
full descriptions of sites, site characteristics, and participant
characteristics by site).
Selection of Replication Studies
Twelve studies producing 13 effects were chosen based on
the following criteria:
1. Suitability for online presentation. Our primary con-
cern was to give each study a ‘‘fair’’ replication that
was true to the original design. By administering the
study through a web browser, we were able to ensure
procedural consistency across sites.
2. Length of study. We selected studies that could be
administered quickly so that we could examine many
of them in a single study session.
3. Simple design. With the exception of one correlational
study, we selected studies that featured a simple,
two-condition design.
1 One sample fell short of this requirement (N = 79) but was still included in the analysis. All sites were encouraged to collect as many
participants as possible beyond the required 80, but the decision to end data collection was determined independently by each site.
Researchers had no access to the data prior to completing data collection.
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4. Diversity of effects. We sought to diversify the sample
of effects by topic, time period of original investiga-
tion, and differing levels of certainty and existing
impact. Justification for study inclusion is described
in the registered proposal (http://osf.io/project/
aBEsQ/).
The Replication Studies
All replication studies were translated into the dominant
language of the country of data collection (N = 7 languages
total; 3/6 translations from English were back-translated).
Next, we provide a brief description of each experiment,
original finding, and known differences between original
and replication studies. Most original studies were con-
ducted with paper and pencil, all replications were con-
ducted via computer. Exact wording for each study,
including a link to the study, can be found in the supple-
mentary materials. The relevant findings from the original
studies can be found in the original proposal.
1. Sunk costs (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, &Davidenko, 2009).
Sunk costs are those that have already been incurred
and cannot be recovered (Knox & Inkster, 1968).
Oppenheimer et al. (2009; adapted from Thaler, 1985)
asked participants to imagine that they have
tickets to see their favorite football team play an
important game, but that it is freezing cold on the
day of the game. Participants rated their likelihood
of attending the game on a 9-point scale (1 = definitely
stay at home, 9 = definitely go to the game). Partici-
pants were marginally more likely to go to the game
if they had paid for the ticket than if the ticket had
been free.
Table 1. Data collection sites
Site identifier Location N
Online (O) or
laboratory (L)
US or
international (I)
Abington Penn State Abington, Abington, PA 84 L US
Brasilia University of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil 120 L I
Charles Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic 84 L I
Conncoll Connecticut College, New London, CT 95 L US
CSUN California State University, Northridge, LA, CA 96 O US
Help HELP University, Malaysia 102 L I
Ithaca Ithaca College, Ithaca, NY 90 L US
JMU James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA 174 O US
KU KoÅ University, Istanbul, Turkey 113 O I
Laurier Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada 112 L I
LSE London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK 277 L I
Luc Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL 146 L US
McDaniel McDaniel College, Westminster, MD 98 O US
MSVU Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada 85 L I
MTURK Amazon Mechanical Turk (US workers only) 1,000 O US
OSU Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 107 L US
Oxy Occidental College, LA, CA 123 L US
PI Project Implicit Volunteers (US citizens/residents only) 1,329 O US
PSU Penn State University, University Park, PA 95 L US
QCCUNY Queens College, City University of New York, NY 103 L US
QCCUNY2 Queens College, City University of New York, NY 86 L US
SDSU SDSU, San Diego, CA 162 L US
SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities Campus Sopot, Sopot, Poland 79 L I
SWPSON Volunteers visiting www.badania.net 169 O I
TAMU Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 187 L US
TAMUC Texas A&M University-Commerce, Commerce, TX 87 L US
TAMUON Texas A&M University, College Station, TX (Online participants) 225 O US
Tilburg Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands 80 L I
UFL University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 127 L US
UNIPD University of Padua, Padua, Italy 144 O I
UVA University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 81 L US
VCU VCU, Richmond, VA 108 L US
Wisc University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI 96 L US
WKU Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green, KY 103 L US
WL Washington & Lee University, Lexington, VA 90 L US
WPI Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA 87 L US
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2. Gain versus loss framing (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981). The original research showed that changing
the focus from losses to gains decreases participants’
willingness to take risks – that is, gamble to get a bet-
ter outcome rather than take a guaranteed result. Par-
ticipants imagined that the US was preparing for the
outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is
expected to kill 600 people. Participants were then
asked to select a course of action to combat the disease
from logically identical sets of alternatives framed in
terms of gains as follows: Program A will save 200
people (400 people will die), or Program B which
has a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved
(nobody will die) and 2/3 probability that no people
will be saved (600 people will die). In the ‘‘gain’’
framing condition, participants are more likely to
adopt Program A, while this effect reverses in the loss
framing condition. The replication replaced the phrase
‘‘the United States’’ with the country of data collec-
tion, and the word ‘‘Asian’’ was omitted from ‘‘an unu-
sual Asian disease.’’
3. Anchoring (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995). Jacowitz
and Kahneman (1995) presented a number of scenarios
in which participants estimated size or distance after
first receiving a number that was clearly too large or
too small. In the original study, participants answered
3 questions about each of 15 topics for which they esti-
mated a quantity. First, they indicated if the quantity
was greater or less than an anchor value. Second, they
estimated the quantity. Third, they indicated their con-
fidence in their estimate. The original number served
as an anchor, biasing estimates to be closer to it. For
the purposes of the replication we provided anchoring
information before asking just for the estimated
quantity for four of the topics from the original study –
distance from San Francisco to New York City, popu-
lation of Chicago, height of Mt. Everest, and babies
born per day in the US for countries that use the metric
system, we converted anchors to metric units and
rounded them.
4. Retrospective gambler’s fallacy (Oppenheimer &
Monin, 2009). Oppenheimer and Monin (2009) inves-
tigated whether the rarity of an independent, chance
observation influenced beliefs about what occurred
before that event. Participants imagined that they
saw a man rolling dice in a casino. In one condition,
participants imagined witnessing three dice being
rolled and all came up 6’s. In a second condition two
came up 6’s and one came up 3. In a third condition,
two dice were rolled and both came up 6’s. All partic-
ipants then estimated, in an open-ended format, how
many times the man had rolled the dice before they
entered the room to watch him. Participants estimated
that the man rolled dice more times when they had
seen him roll three 6’s than when they had seen him
roll two 6’s or two 6’s and a 3. For the replication,
the condition in which the man rolls two 6’s was
removed leaving two conditions.
5. Low-versus-high category scales (Schwarz, Hippler,
Deutsch, & Strack, 1985). Schwarz and colleagues
(1985) demonstrated that people infer from response
options what are low and high frequencies of a behav-
ior, and self-assess accordingly. In the original demon-
stration, participants were asked how much TV they
watch daily on a low-frequency scale ranging from
‘‘up to half an hour’’ to ‘‘more than two and a half
hours,’’ or a high-frequency scale ranging from ‘‘up
to two and a half hours’’ to ‘‘more than four and a half
hours.’’ In the low-frequency condition, fewer partici-
pants reported watching TV for more than two and a
half hours than in the high-frequency condition.
6. Norm of reciprocity (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1950).
When confronted with a decision about allowing or
denying the same behavior to an ingroup and outgroup,
people may feel an obligation to reciprocity, or consis-
tency in their evaluation of the behaviors (Hyman &
Sheatsley, 1950). In the original study, American par-
ticipants answered two questions: whether communist
countries should allow American reporters in and
allow them to report the news back to American papers
and whether America should allow communist report-
ers into the United States and allow them to report
back to their papers. Participants reported more sup-
port for allowing communist reporters into America
when that question was asked after the question about
allowing American reporters into the communist coun-
tries. In the replication, we changed the question
slightly to ensure the ‘‘other country’’ was a suitable,
modern target (North Korea). For international replica-
tion, the target country was determined by the
researcher heading that replication to ensure suitability
(see supplementary materials).
7. Allowed/Forbidden (Rugg, 1941). Question phrasing
can influence responses. Rugg (1941) found that
respondents were less likely to endorse forbidding
speeches against democracy than they were to not
endorse allowing speeches against democracy.
Respondents in the United States were asked, in one
condition, if the US should allow speeches against
democracy or, in another condition, whether the US
should forbid speeches against democracy. Sixty-two
percent of participants indicated ‘‘No’’ when asked if
speeches against democracy should be allowed, but
only 46% indicated ‘‘Yes’’ when asked if these
speeches should be forbidden. In the replication, the
words ‘‘The United States’’ were replaced with the
name of the country the study was administered in.
8. Quote Attribution (Lorge & Curtiss, 1936). The source
of information has a great impact on how that informa-
tion is perceived and evaluated. Lorge and Curtiss
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(1936) examined how an identical quote would be per-
ceived if it was attributed to a liked or disliked individ-
ual. Participants were asked to rate their agreement
with a list of quotations. The quotation of interest
was, ‘‘I hold it that a little rebellion, now and then,
is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world
as storms are in the physical world.’’ In one condition
the quote was attributed to Thomas Jefferson, a liked
individual, and in the other it was attributed to Vladi-
mir Lenin, a disliked individual. More agreement was
observed when the quote was attributed to Jefferson
than Lenin (reported in Moskowitz, 2004). In the rep-
lication, we used a quote attributed to either George
Washington (liked individual) or Osama Bin Laden
(disliked individual).
9. Flag Priming (Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2011;
Study 2). The American flag is a powerful symbol in
American culture. Carter et al. (2011) examined how
subtle exposure to the flag may increase conservatism
among US participants. Participants were presented
with four photos and asked to estimate the time of
day at which they were taken. In the flag-prime condi-
tion, the American flag appeared in two of these pho-
tos. In the control condition, the same photos were
presented without flags. Following the manipulation,
participants completed an 8-item questionnaire assess-
ing views toward various political issues (e.g., abor-
tion, gun control, affirmative action). Participants in
the flag-primed condition indicated significantly more
conservative positions than those in the control condi-
tion. The priming stimuli used to replicate this finding
were obtained from the authors and identical to those
used in the original study. Because it was impractical
to edit the images with unique national flags, the
American flag was always used as a prime. As a con-
sequence, the replications in the United States were the
only ones considered as direct replications. For inter-
national replications, the survey questions were
adapted slightly to ensure they were appropriate for
the political climate of the country, as judged by the
researcher heading that particular replication (see sup-
plementary materials). Further, the original authors
suggested possible moderators that they have consid-
ered since publication of the original study. We
included three items at the very end of the replication
study to test these moderators: (1) How much do you
identify with being American? (1 = not at all;
11 = very much), (2) To what extent do you think
the typical American is a Republican or Democrat?
(1 = Democrat; 7 = Republican), (3) To what extent
do you think the typical American is conservative or
liberal? (1 = Liberal; 7 = Conservative).
10. Currency priming (Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, & Waytz,
2013). Money is a powerful symbol. Caruso et al.
(2013) provide evidence that merely exposing partic-
ipants to money increases their endorsement of the
current social system. Participants were first pre-
sented with demographic questions, with the back-
ground of the page manipulated between subjects.
In one condition the background showed a faint pic-
ture of US$100 bills; in the other condition the back-
ground was a blurred, unidentifiable version of the
same picture. Next, participants completed an 8-ques-
tion ‘‘system justification scale’’ (Kay & Jost, 2003).
Participants in the money-prime condition scored
higher on the system justification scale than those
in the control condition. The authors provided the ori-
ginal materials allowing us to construct a near identi-
cal replication for US participants. However, the
stimuli were modified for international replications
in two ways: First, the US dollar was usually replaced
with the relevant country’s currency (see supplemen-
tary materials); Second, the system justification ques-
tions were adapted to reflect the name of the relevant
country.
11. Imagined contact (Husnu & Crisp, 2010; Study 1).
Recent evidence suggests that merely imagining con-
tact with members of ethnic outgroups is sufficient to
reduce prejudice toward those groups (Turner, Crisp,
& Lambert, 2007). In Husnu and Crisp (2010), British
non-Muslim participants were assigned to either
imagine interacting with a British Muslim stranger
or to imagine that they were walking outdoors (con-
trol condition). Participants imagined the scene for
one minute, and then described their thoughts for an
additional minute before indicating their interest
and willingness to interact with British Muslims on
a four-item scale. Participants in the ‘‘imagined con-
tact’’ group had significantly higher contact inten-
tions than participants in the control group. In the
replication, the word ‘‘British’’ was removed from
all references to ‘‘British Muslims.’’ Additionally,
for the predominately Muslim sample from Turkey
the items were adapted so Christians were the out-
group target.
12. Sex differences in implicit math attitudes (Nosek,
Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). As a possible account
for the sex gap in participation in science and math,
Nosek and colleagues (2002) found that women had
more negative implicit attitudes toward math com-
pared to arts than men did in two studies of Yale
undergraduates. Participants completed four Implicit
Association Tests (IATs) in random order, one of
which measured associations of math and arts with
positivity and negativity. The replication simplified
the design for length to be just a single IAT.
13. Implicit math attitudes relations with self-reported
attitudes (Nosek et al., 2002). In the same study as
Effect 12, self-reported math attitudes were measured
with a composite of feeling thermometers and seman-
tic differential ratings, and the composite was posi-
tively related with the implicit measure. The
replication used a subset of the explicit items (see
supplementary materials).
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Procedure
The experiments were implemented on the Project Implicit
infrastructure and all data were automatically recorded in a
central database with a code identifying the sample source.
After a paragraph of introduction, the studies were pre-
sented in a randomized order, except that the math IAT
and associated explicit measures were always the final
study. After the studies, participants completed an instruc-
tional manipulation check (IMC; Oppenheimer et al.,
2009), a short demographic questionnaire, and then the
moderator measures for flag priming. See Table S12 for
IMC and summary demographic information by site. The
IMC was not analyzed further for this report. Each replica-
tion team had a private link for their participants, and they
coordinated their own data collection. Experimenters in lab-
oratory studies were not aware of participant condition for
each task, and did not interact with participants during data
collection unless participants had questions. Investigators
who led replications at specific sites completed a question-
naire about the experimental setting (responses summarized
in Table S1), and details and videos of each setting along
with the actual materials, links to run the study, supplemen-
tal tables, datasets, and original proposal are available at
https://osf.io/ydpbf/.
Confirmatory Analysis Plan
Prior to data collection we specified a confirmatory analysis
plan. All confirmatory analyses are reported either in text or
in supplementary materials. A few of the tasks produced
highly erratic distributions (particularly anchoring) requir-
ing revisions to those analysis plans. A summary of differ-
ences between the original plans and actual analysis is
reported in the supplementary materials.
Results
Summary Results
Figure 1 presents an aggregate summary of replications of
the 13 effects, presenting each of the four anchoring effects
separately. Table 2 presents the original effect size, median
effect size, weighted and unweighted effect size and
99% confidence intervals, and proportion of samples that
rejected the null hypothesis in the expected and unexpected
direction. In the aggregate, 10 of the 13 studies replicated
the original results with varying distance from the original
Figure 1. Replication results organized by effect. ‘‘X’’ indicates the effect size obtained in the original study. Large
circles represent the aggregate effect size obtained across all participants. Error bars represent 99% noncentral
confidence intervals around the effects. Small circles represent the effect sizes obtained within each site (black and
white circles for US and international replications, respectively).
2 Table names that begin with the prefix ‘‘S’’ (e.g., Table S1) refer to tables that can be found in the supplementary materials. Tables with
no prefix are in this paper.
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effect size. One study, imagined contact, showed a signifi-
cant effect in the expected direction in just 4 of the 36 sam-
ples (and once in the wrong direction), but the confidence
intervals for the aggregate effect size suggest that it is
slightly different than zero. Two studies – flag priming
and currency priming – did not replicate the original ef-
fects. Each of these had just one p-value < .05 and it was
in the wrong direction for flag priming. The aggregate ef-
fect size was near zero whether using the median, weighted
mean, or unweighted mean. All confidence intervals in-
cluded zero. Figure 1 presents all 36 samples for flag prim-
ing, but only US data collections were counted for the
confirmatory analysis (see Table 2). International samples
also did not show a flag priming effect (weighted mean
d = .03, 99% CI [.04, .10]). To rule out the possibility
that the priming effects were contaminated by the contents
of other experimental materials, we reexamined only those
participants who completed these tasks first. Again, there
was no effect (Flag Priming: t(431) = 0.33, p = .75,
95% CI [.171, .240], Cohen’s d = .03; Currency Priming:
t(605) = 0.56, p = .57, 95% CI [.201, .112], Cohen’s
d = .05).3
When an effect size for the original study could be
calculated, it is presented as an ‘‘X’’ in Figure 1. For three
effects (contact, flag priming, and currency priming), the
original effect is larger than for any sample in the present
study, with the observed median or mean effect at or below
the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for the ori-
ginal effect.4 Though the sex difference in implicit math
attitudes effect was within the 95% confidence interval of
the original result, the replication estimate combined with
another large-scale replication (Nosek & Smyth, 2011) sug-
gests that the original effect was an overestimate.
Variation Across Samples and Settings
Figure 1 demonstrates substantial variation for some of the
observed effects. That variation could be a function of the
true effect size, random error, sample differences, or setting
differences. Comparing the intra-class correlation of sam-
ples across effects (ICC = .005; F(35, 385) = 1.06,
p = .38, 95% CI [.027, .065]) with the intra-class
correlation of effects across samples (ICC = .75;
F(12,420) = 110.62, p < .001, 95% CI [.60, .89]) suggests
that very little in the variability of effect sizes can be attrib-
uted to the samples, and substantial variability is attribut-
able to the effect under investigation. To illustrate,
Figure 2 shows the same data as Figure 1 organized by
sample rather than by effect. There is almost no variation
in the average effect size across samples.
However, it is possible that particular samples would
elicit larger magnitudes for some effects and smaller mag-
nitudes for others. That might be missed by the aggregate
analyses. Table 3 presents tests of whether the heterogene-
ity of effect sizes for each effect exceeds what is expected
by measurement error. Cochran’s Q and I2 statistics
Figure 2. Replication results organized by site. Gray circles represent the effect size obtained for each effect within a
site. Black circles represent the mean effect size obtained within a site. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval
around the mean.
3 None of the effects was moderated by which position in the study procedure it was administered.
4 The original anchoring report did not distinguish between topics so the aggregate effect size is reported.
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revealed that heterogeneity of effect sizes was largely ob-
served among the very large effects – anchoring, al-
lowed-forbidden, and relations between implicit and
explicit attitudes. Only one other effect – quote attribution
– showed substantial heterogeneity. This appears to be
partly attributable to this effect occurring more strongly
in US samples and to a lesser degree in international
samples.
To test for moderation by key characteristics of the
setting, we conducted a Condition · Country (US or
other) · Location (lab or online) ANOVA for each effect.
Table 3 presents the essential Condition · Country and
Condition · Location effects. Full model results are avail-
able in supplementary materials. A total of 10 of the
32 moderation tests were significant, and seven of those
were among the largest effects – anchoring and allowed-
forbidden. Even including those, none of the moderation ef-
fect sizes exceeded a gp
2 of .022. The heterogeneity in
anchoring effects may be attributable to differences in
knowledge of the height of Mt Everest, distance to NYC,
or population of Chicago between the samples. Overall,
whether the sample was collected in the US or elsewhere,
or whether data collection occurred online or in the labora-
tory, had little systematic effect on the observed results.
Additional possible moderators of the flag priming
effect were suggested by the original authors. On the US
participants only (N  4,670), with five hierarchical regres-
sion models, we tested whether the items moderated the
effect of the manipulation. They did not (p’s = .48, .80,
.62, .07, .05, all DR2 < .001). Details are available in the
online supplement.
Discussion
A large-scale replication with 36 samples successfully rep-
licated eleven of 13 classic and contemporary effects in
psychological science, some of which are well-known to
be robust, and others that have been replicated infrequently
or not at all. The original studies produced underestimates
of some effects (e.g., anchoring-and-adjustment and
allowed versus forbidden message framing), and overesti-
mates of other effects (e.g., imagined contact producing
willingness to interact with outgroups in the future). Two
effects – flag priming influencing conservatism and cur-
rency priming influencing system justification – did not
replicate.
A primary goal of this investigation was to examine the
heterogeneity of effect sizes by the wide variety of samples
and settings, and to provide an example of a paradigm for
testing such variation. Some studies were conducted online,
others in the laboratory. Some studies were conducted in
the United States, others elsewhere. And, a wide variety
of educational institutions took part. Surprisingly, these fac-
tors did not produce highly heterogeneous effect sizes.
Table 3. Tests of effect size heterogeneity
Heterogeneity statistics Moderation tests
Effect Q DF p I2
US or
international p gp
2
Laboratory
or online p gp
2
Anchoring – babies born 59.71 35 0.01 0.402 0.16 0.69 0.00 16.14 <0.01 0.00
Anchoring – Mt. Everest 152.34 35 <.0001 0.754 94.33 <0.01 0.02 119.56 <0.01 0.02
Allowed/forbidden 180.40 35 <.0001 0.756 70.37 <0.01 0.01 0.55 0.46 0.00
Anchoring – Chicago 312.75 35 <.0001 0.913 0.62 0.43 0.00 32.95 <0.01 0.01
Anchoring – distance to NYC 88.16 35 <.0001 0.643 9.35 <0.01 0.00 15.74 <0.01 0.00
Relations between I and E math attitudes 54.84 34 <.0001 0.401 0.41* 0.52 <.001* 2.80* 0.09 <.001*
Retrospective gambler fallacy 50.83 35 0.04 0.229 0.40 0.53 0.00 0.34 0.56 0.00
Gain vs. loss framing 37.01 35 0.37 0.0001 0.09 0.76 0.00 1.11 0.29 0.00
Sex differences in implicit math attitudes 47.60 34 0.06 0.201 0.82 0.37 0.00 1.07 0.30 0.00
Low vs. high category scales 36.02 35 0.42 0.192 0.16 0.69 0.00 0.02 0.88 0.00
Quote attribution 67.69 35 <.001 0.521 8.81 <0.01 0.001 0.50 0.48 0.00
Norm of reciprocity 38.89 35 0.30 0.172 5.76 0.02 0.00 0.64 0.43 0.00
Sunk costs 35.55 35 0.44 0.092 0.58 0.45 0.00 0.25 0.62 0.00
Imagined contact 45.87 35 0.10 0.206 0.53 0.47 0.00 4.88 0.03 0.00
Flag priming 30.33 35 0.69 0 0.53 0.47 0.00 1.85 0.17 0.00
Currency priming 28.41 35 0.78 0 1.00 0.32 0.00 0.11 0.74 0.00
Notes. Tasks ordered from largest to smallest observed effect size (see Table 2). Heterogeneity tests conducted with R-package
metafor. REML was used for estimation for all tests. One sample was removed from sex difference and relations between implicit and
explicit math attitudes because of a systemic error in that laboratory’s recording of reaction times.
*Moderator statistics are F value of the interaction of condition and the moderator from an ANOVA with condition, country, and
location as independent variables with the exception of relations between impl. and expl. math attitudes for is reported the F value
associated with the change in R squared after the product term between the independent variable and the moderator is added in a
hierarchical linear regression model. Details of all analyses are available in the supplement.
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Intraclass correlations suggested that most of the variation
in effects was due to the effect under investigation and
almost none to the particular sample used. Focused tests
of moderating influences elicited sporadic and small effects
of the setting, while tests of heterogeneity suggested that
most of the variation in effects is attributable to measure-
ment error. Further, heterogeneity was mostly restricted to
the largest effects in the sample – counter to an intuition
that small effects would be the most likely to be variable
across sample and setting. Further, the lack of heterogeneity
is particularly interesting considering that there is substan-
tial interest and commentary about the contingency of
effects on our two moderators, lab versus online (Gosling,
Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Paolacci, Chandler, &
Ipeirotis, 2010), and cultural variation across nations
(Henrich et al., 2010).
All told, the main conclusion from this small sample of
studies is that, to predict effect size, it is much more impor-
tant to know what effect is being studied than to know the
sample or setting in which it is being studied. The key vir-
tue of the present investigation is that the study procedure
was highly standardized across data collection settings.
This minimized the likelihood that factors other than sam-
ple and setting contributed to systematic variation in
effects. At the same time, this conclusion is surely con-
strained by the small, nonrandom sample of studies repre-
sented here. Additionally, the replication sites included in
this project cannot capture all possible cultural variation,
and most societies sampled were relatively Western,
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD;
Henrich et al., 2010). Nonetheless, the present investigation
suggests that we should not necessarily assume that there
are differences between samples; indeed, even when mod-
eration was observed in this sample, the effects were still
quite robust in each setting.
The present investigation provides a summary analysis
of a very large, rich dataset. This dataset will be useful
for additional exploratory analysis about replicability in
general, and these effects in particular. The data are avail-
able for download at the Open Science Framework (https://
osf.io/ydpbf/).
Conclusion
This investigation offered novel insights into variation in
the replicability of psychological effects, and specific infor-
mation about the replicability of 13 effects. This methodol-
ogy – crowdsourcing dozens of laboratories running an
identical procedure – can be adapted for a variety of inves-
tigations. It allows for increased confidence in the existence
of an effect and for the investigation of an effect’s depen-
dence on the particular circumstances of data collection
(Open Science Collaboration, 2014). Further, a consortium
of laboratories could provide mutual support for each other
by conducting similar large-scale investigations on original
research questions, not just replications. Thus, collective ef-
fort could accelerate the identification and verification of
extant and novel psychological effects.
Note From the Editors
Commentaries and a rejoinder on this paper are available
(Crisp, Miles, & Husnu, 2014; Ferguson, Carter, & Hassin,
2014; Kahneman, 2014; Klein et al., 2014; Monin &
Oppenheimer, 2014; Schwarz & Strack, 2014; doi:
10.1027/1864-9335/a000202).
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